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Searching for a Just and Lasting Peace? Anglo-American Relations and the Road to United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 242 
  
2 
 
Abstract 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 continues to rank as a 
key point of reference for the Arab-Israeli peace process. The resolution laid down a 'land for 
peace' formula for the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, under which Israel would 
withdraw from territories occupied during the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War in exchange for 
full peace agreements with her Arab neighbours. This article analyses the Anglo-American 
diplomacy at the United Nations which led to the passing of the resolution. It argues that the 
policy-making of the Johnson Administration was rendered incoherent by internal rivalries 
and disorganisation. US Ambassador to the UN, Arthur Goldberg, was perceived as 
excessively sympathetic to Israel by the Arab delegations. The British approach, by contrast, 
was perceived by all parties as more even-handed. The clear position adopted by Foreign 
Secretary George Brown on Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, together with 
the skilful diplomacy of the Ambassador to the UN, Lord Caradon, explains the British 
success in sponsoring resolution 242. The episode holds broader lessons for the conduct of 
Anglo-American relations showing that Britain was better placed to achieve diplomatic 
success when it retained its freedom of manoeuvre in relations with the US. 
 
Key Words: Anglo-American relations; United Nations; Arab-Israeli conflict; Lyndon 
Johnson; Israel. 
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 Nearly half a century after its passage, United Nations Security Council Resolution 
242 of 22 November 1967 continues to rank as a key point of reference for the Arab-Israeli 
peace process. While describing the resolution variously as a 'remarkable study in ambiguity' 
and 'ambiguously balanced', Roger Louis has also called it 'a British triumph, perhaps as 
significant in its own way as the Balfour Declaration fifty years earlier'.
1
 In essence, the 
resolution laid down a 'land for peace' formula for the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
under which Israel would withdraw from territories occupied during the June 1967 Arab-
Israeli War in exchange for full peace agreements with her Arab neighbours. This formula for 
peace was subsequently successfully employed in the negotiation of the 1979 Egyptian-
Israeli peace treaty. The two operative clauses of the resolution call for: 'withdrawal of Israeli 
armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict'; and 'termination of all claims or 
states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace 
within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.'
2
 
 Important though resolution 242 remains as a landmark in the Arab-Israeli peace 
process, the focus here will be on another less remarked aspect of the passage of the 
resolution - what it signified for Anglo-American relations. The resolution was passed at a 
key juncture in this respect, sandwiched between the announcement of the devaluation of the 
Pound Sterling on the 18 November 1967, and the British Cabinet's final decision on 15 
January 1968 to withdraw its armed forces from 'East of Suez' by the end of 1971. The 
backdrop for this 'British triumph' could thus hardly have been less promising in terms of the 
trajectory of British power. The devaluation of Sterling marked the humiliating end of a 
protracted struggle to maintain the currency's parity within the Bretton Woods system, while 
the abandonment of remaining defence commitments East of Suez represented a watershed in 
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Britain's retreat from its world power role.
3
 For all the attention drawn by the Wilson 
Government's artful refusal to commit troops to the Vietnam War between 1965 and 1968, it 
was these twin decisions which arguably had a much greater immediate and enduring impact 
on the course of Anglo-American relations.
4
 While President Lyndon Johnson's late night 
telephone explosion to Prime Minister Harold Wilson in February 1965 on the subject of 
Vietnam – 'I won’t tell you how to run Malaysia, and you don’t tell us how to run Vietnam' 
was theatrical - it was his message regarding the British plans for withdrawal from East of 
Suez sent on 11 January 1968 which was the more emotive.
5
 'I cannot conceal from you my 
deep dismay upon learning this profoundly discouraging news', he wrote. 'If these steps are 
taken, they will be tantamount to British withdrawal from world affairs, with all that means 
for the future safety and health of the free world. The structure of peace-keeping will be 
shaken to its foundations. Our own capability and political will could be gravely weakened if 
we have to man the ramparts all alone.'
6
 
 Against the backdrop of these momentous events, it is perhaps not surprising that 
resolution 242 and the diplomacy which surrounded it have drawn rather less attention from 
scholars of British policy and Anglo-American relations in the Middle East.
7
 In so far as it 
has been treated in this historiography resolution 242 has tended to be seen as an example of 
Anglo-American cooperation. Indeed the US Ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur 
Goldberg, went so far as to claim that the US delegation was primarily responsible for the 
wording of the British draft and for the leg-work of recommending it in national capitals.
8
 
The British role under this interpretation was essentially one of taking over an American 
initiative in the final stages of the negotiations and effectively resolving the remaining minor 
semantic disputes. This conjures up the image of a sort of diplomatic relay race, with the 
United States passing the baton of resolution 242 to Britain on the final leg, with the latter 
charged merely with running it over the line for victory from a commanding position.  
5 
 
 In fact, the course of Anglo-American relations from the end of the June War to the 
passage of resolution 242 did not run quite as smoothly as this metaphor might imply. Key 
British officials demonstrated not only a willingness to act independently of their American 
counterparts, but also aired frequent disagreements on vital aspects of the Arab-Israeli peace 
process. Part of the reason for this was the relative incoherence which characterised the 
framing of the Johnson Administration's Middle East policy at this juncture. But there was 
also an underlying difference in perspective regarding policy towards Israel and the Arab 
states as between Britain and the United States. Because of the personal sympathies of key 
members of the Johnson Administration, including the President himself, and the American 
domestic political landscape, US policy consistently exhibited more deference towards and 
understanding of Israeli interests than did that of the British government. Conversely, on the 
British side, the economic threat posed by the closure of the Suez Canal and the British 
interest in security of access to Gulf oil supplies meant that there was a tendency for the key 
officials to give greater weight to Arab reactions in the formulation of policy towards the 
region. 
 The argument here will illuminate the path to the passing of resolution 242 in terms of 
Anglo-American relations, firstly by introducing the key British and American diplomatic 
players; secondly by contextualising British and American policy towards the region; and 
thirdly by analysing the key areas of Anglo-American debate and disagreement over the 
Arab-Israeli peace process between the end of the June war and the passing of resolution 242 
in late November 1967. By way of conclusion, an analysis of what this episode signifies more 
broadly, particularly for scholarship of contemporary Anglo-American relations, will be 
offered. 
The two key players among many on the British side were the Foreign Secretary 
George Brown and the British Ambassador to the United Nations, Lord Caradon. Brown's 
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role in the framing of the British position regarding a Middle East peace settlement was 
central. By this stage of his career, Brown had acquired a reputation for being 'pro-Arab' in 
outlook. This was largely because of the good personal relations he had established with 
various Arab leaders including Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and King Hussein of 
Jordan, which dated back to the early 1950s. But this characterisation represents an over-
simplification of his views. Brown's wife, Sophie, was Jewish, and like other leading 
members of the Labour Party, Brown had also developed contacts with leaders of the Israeli 
labour movement.
9
 During the 1950s he had been introduced by Hugh Gaitskell, the pro-
Zionist Labour Party leader, to key Israelis including Moshe Dayan and Yigal Allon. A letter 
in the private files of King Hussein relating to a subsequent visit Brown paid to Israel in early 
1970, makes clear that Brown was evidently sufficiently trusted by at least certain senior 
Israelis for him to be used as a covert channel to Hussein: 'You and I met just before I went to 
what we call the Middle East', Brown wrote to the King. 'I think you should know that I am 
still being used as a post-box. Letters these days are bad. Too many people read them. I 
wonder if I could meet you, or anybody you would nominate, in any place to have a talk 
about the situation as I now think it to be.' The concluding lines of Brown's conspiratorial 
letter are indicative of his broader, temperamental approach to the handling of Middle East 
diplomacy, which characterised his tenure as Foreign Secretary: 'I am for helping. I reckon 
there is still a chance and you and I together can handle the rest of the world!'
10
 Brown, as 
this private letter implies, was mercurial, outspoken, confident in his abilities, and intelligent, 
but, also occasionally erratic and abrasive. This was due in part to his alcoholism.
11
 As one 
former Foreign Office official has observed, 'Brown was a hard drinker and invariably not 
sober at the evening meetings that he regularly called.'
12
 In terms of the course of Anglo-
American relations after the June war, the combination of Brown's temperament, his intimate 
knowledge of the region and its leaders, his firm views as to the rights and wrongs of the 
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Arab-Israeli conflict and his bluntness made for periodic disagreement and an undercurrent of 
tension, especially in relations with the US Mission to the United Nations led by Ambassador 
Arthur Goldberg. 
 The head of the British Mission at the UN, meanwhile, was an almost perfect 
temperamental foil for Brown and an expert in defusing the tensions which the Foreign 
Secretary's approach sometimes aroused. Lord Caradon, previously (Sir) Hugh Foot, had 
served in various colonial administrative roles, including postings as Governor of the Gold 
Coast and of Cyprus. Crucially, Caradon had also served for eight years in Palestine during 
the British mandate which gave him a particular interest in the Middle East. Among other 
attributes, Caradon spoke Arabic which eased his path in maintaining good relations with the 
Arab delegations in New York.
13
 More broadly, he was well known both for his sympathy for 
colonial independence movements and his contacts with Third World nationalists. He was 
also deeply committed to the role of the United Nations, an outlook which he shared with 
Foreign Secretary Brown. Caradon had acquired a deep and detailed knowledge of UN 
procedures which he deployed to great effect in the negotiations leading up to the passing of 
resolution 242. Temperamentally, he was much steadier and less exuberant than Brown, 
although he also had more than a dash of personal vanity. He showed considerable patience 
as well as persistence and resolve in playing what was often a difficult diplomatic hand in 
New York.
14
 
 While Brown and Caradon were the key players on the British side, the role of Prime 
Minister Harold Wilson is also worthy of brief mention. Although Wilson left the 
management of British diplomacy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict largely in Brown's hands, 
it is arguable he played an important balancing role in the background. Wilson was a staunch 
Zionist and friend of Israel, whose personal sympathies were well known to the Israeli 
government.
15
 Throughout the period before and after the 1967 war, Wilson maintained his 
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own back channel to the Israeli Ambassador in London, Aharom Ramez, via Gerald 
Kaufman, who was at that stage his parliamentary press liaison officer.
16
 Although Wilson 
did not play the leading diplomatic role, it is arguable that he in fact supported Brown's 
efforts by dissipating potential dissent on the part of other Labour Zionists, such as Lord 
President of the Council, Richard Crossman.
17
 He was also able to calm some Israeli fears 
about the direction of British policy by supplying information to them through the Kaufman 
back channel.
18
 
On the US side there were also arguably two key players among several: President 
Lyndon B. Johnson and Ambassador to the United Nations Arthur Goldberg. Although his 
main foreign policy focus was on the Vietnam War, President Johnson was unabashed about 
his personal sympathy for Israel, which conditioned his handling of both the crisis which led 
to war in 1967 and the post-war diplomacy which resulted in resolution 242. He later noted 
that ‘I have always had a deep feeling of sympathy for Israel and its people, gallantly 
building and defending a modern nation against great odds….’19 Certainly, the Israeli 
government saw Johnson's personal sympathy as one of its key assets in influencing the 
course of US policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. Meanwhile, "Judge" Goldberg as he 
preferred to be known (although his correct title was "Justice") was a leading member of the 
American Jewish community. Johnson, who had personally persuaded Goldberg to leave a 
lifetime position at the Supreme Court to take up the post of Ambassador, described 
Goldberg as ‘an old and trusted friend’ who would always have ‘direct and ready access to… 
the President’.20 As Goldberg told the CIA officer, Jack O'Connell, who was temporarily 
assigned to his staff to handle the private negotiations with the Arabs, especially with King 
Hussein, at the UN, 'well, O'Connell, as you can see, I have a blank check from the President. 
I also have a blank check from the American Jewish community. They will buy whatever I 
decide upon. Your king and the other Arabs should know that I hold the key.'
21
 The British 
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were also all too well aware of Goldberg's political influence, particularly of his standing 
with President Johnson. A hand written annotation by George Brown on one despatch 
detailing Goldberg's role reads: 'the "Justice" is a real politician whom the President needs 
(especially now!)'
22
 
While one would have expected the State Department to play a leading role in the 
negotiations at the UN, its effectiveness was largely neutered by two key factors. Firstly, the 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk kept the negotiations largely at arm's length, allowing 
Ambassador Goldberg to take the lead. Secondly, Eugene Rostow, the Under-Secretary of 
State for Political Affairs who chaired the so called Control Group within the State 
Department which was notionally responsible for the coordination of policy towards the 
peace negotiations, was notoriously disorganised and erratic.
23
 As the senior National 
Security Council staffer responsible for the Middle East, Harold Saunders, later commented, 
people in the State Department felt that Rostow's Control Group was a 'floating crap game': 'a 
fluid, amoeba-like, unsystematic' decision-making process.
24
 This lack of coordination in the 
State Department opened the way for Goldberg to take charge. 
In terms of the context for policy-making, differences in the trajectory of British and 
American policy in the Middle East pre-dated the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War. While both 
powers had troubled relations with the Arab nationalist regime of Egyptian President Nasser, 
in the months leading up to the outbreak of war the British Foreign Secretary, George Brown, 
had devoted a considerable effort to retrieving Britain's relations with Egypt, which had been 
broken off at Nasser's instigation on 17 December 1965 in the wake of the Rhodesian 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence. Brown's efforts bore fruit to the extent that the 
British received informal diplomatic signals that Egypt would like to renew diplomatic 
relations, with 1 July 1967 floated as a possible date, before the June war intervened.
25
 
Meanwhile, US relations with Egypt had run precipitously downhill in the months leading up 
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to the outbreak of war with the departing US Ambassador, Lucius Battle, noting that, in his 
final interview with the Egyptian President in March 1967, Nasser had launched into a 'thirty 
minute tirade [against US policy] of [the] most emotional character yet displayed in my 
meetings with him.'
26
 
 Nevertheless, both powers were able to cooperate up to a certain point during the 
crisis which preceded the outbreak of war on 5 June 1967. Perhaps surprisingly it was the 
British government which was the more proactive during the first phase of the crisis, taking 
the lead in proposing the creation of a multinational naval force to convoy ships through the 
Gulf of Aqaba in the wake of Nasser's announcement of the closure of the Straits of Tiran 
from 23 May. Preoccupied with events in Vietnam, the Johnson Administration's approach 
was to a certain extent passive, although the President did caution Israeli Foreign Minister 
Abba Eban against launching a war during the latter's visit to Washington on 26 May 1967. 
'Israel must not make itself responsible for initiating hostilities', the President warned.
27
 By 
the beginning of June, however, both the British and American positions had become more 
ambivalent. The British Cabinet backed away from taking the lead over the convoying 
proposal due both to military concerns about the vulnerability of naval forces in the confines 
of the Gulf of Aqaba and political concerns about the impact of any such action on its 
relations with the Arab oil-producing states. Meanwhile, the President's initial red light to 
Israel had shifted to an amber, shading over to a green light in the wake of Mossad Chief 
Meir Amit's visit to Washington between 31 May and 2 June. The President's final pre-war 
letter to Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol indicated indirectly that he had received and 
understood Amit's warnings, delivered to Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and CIA 
Director Richard Helms, that Israel could not wait any longer before launching an attack on 
Egypt. 'We have completely and fully exchanged views with General Amit', the President 
wrote.
28
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Meanwhile a Johnson-Wilson summit and a meeting of senior British and American 
officials in Washington on 2 June did little to advance the cause of multilateral contingency 
planning for naval action to open the Straits of Tiran.
29
 Indeed, the limits of Anglo-American 
cooperation were amply illustrated by Walt Rostow's private advice to the President that the 
British should be kept in the dark about a contemporaneous approach from the Israeli 
Minister in Washington, Ephraim Evron, exploring the possible American response to an 
Israeli naval probe through the Gulf of Aqaba designed to precipitate a confrontation with 
Nasser. 'It is my judgment that the Evron conversation should not be shared with Prime 
Minister Wilson', Rostow wrote.
30
 Given that the Administration was supposed to be 
cooperating with the British in organising the convoying of ships through the Straits this was 
an extraordinary omission. 
 The nuances of British and American policy in the region were of little concern to the 
Arab states as the extent of their defeat became apparent early in the ensuing war. Both 
Britain and the United States were unjustly tarred with the same brush of the so called "Big 
Lie", the claim, which appears to have originated in a telephone exchange between King 
Hussein of Jordan and President Nasser in the early hours 6 June, that they had participated in 
the Israeli air assault on the opening day of the war.
31
 While King Hussein publicly retracted 
the claim on American television on 27 June, the damage had already been done in terms of 
Arab public opinion.
32
 The "Big Lie" formed part of what was an unpromising backdrop for 
post-war British and American diplomacy over the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
 In the wake of the formal ceasefires on the battlefield, efforts to find a diplomatic 
solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict focused on the United Nations. With the Security Council 
divided, the Soviet Union instead requested an Emergency Special Session of the United 
Nations General Assembly which convened on 17 June. This Soviet move was seen in 
London and Washington as a device to transfer debate to a forum more likely to be 
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sympathetic to the position of the Arab states. Anglo-American differences in approach soon 
became apparent during this special session of the General Assembly and focused initially on 
the principles outlined in a speech given by British Foreign Secretary George Brown.  
 Brown's speech to the General Assembly on 21 June touched on two points which 
were controversial to the extent that they were unwelcome to the Israeli government and to a 
large degree to the Johnson Administration. The first concerned the inadmissibility under the 
UN Charter of territorial gains made by conquest. The second concerned the status of 
Jerusalem.
33
 On both issues Brown went further than the Johnson Administration would have 
liked.
34
 As Sir Leslie Glass, a senior member of the British delegation to the UN noted, the 
Foreign Secretary's speech, and his comments on Jerusalem in particular, 'did much to dispel 
the feeling that Her Majesty's Government would inevitably follow an American pro-Israel 
policy.'
35
 On withdrawal, Frank Brenchley, then assistant under-secretary of state for Middle 
East affairs, later recollected that on the plane over to New York, Brown was unhappy with 
the anodyne draft for his speech prepared by the Foreign Office and demanded a re-draft with 
'more life in it'. Specifically, he instructed Brenchley to strengthen the sections on the 
inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by conquest and of any Israeli actions to change 
the status of Jerusalem. This was despite the fact that Brenchley warned him these changes 
would produce 'a speech highly objectionable to the Israelis'.
36
 Specifically, on withdrawal, 
Brown was unequivocal: 'I see no two ways about this, and I state our position very clearly. 
In my view, from the words in the Charter, war should not lead to territorial aggrandisement.' 
On Jerusalem, he addressed the Israeli Government even more directly: 'I call on the State of 
Israel not to take any steps in relation to Jerusalem which would conflict with this principle. I 
say very solemnly to the Government of Israel that, if they purport to annex the Old City or 
legislate for its annexation, they will be taking a step which will not only isolate them from 
world opinion, but will also lose them the sympathy that they have.'
37
 As Brenchley noted, 
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Brown was calling unequivocally on the Israelis to withdraw from all the territory they had 
occupied, including East Jerusalem. As Brown left the Assembly there was time for one more 
moment of drama. By chance, and somewhat to his own consternation, Brown immediately 
ran into the Israeli delegation which included Golda Meir, one of the Israeli friends Brown 
had made through his attendance at meetings of the Socialist International. Brenchley, who 
was at his side, noted that without a moment's hesitation Brown went over to kiss Golda Meir 
on the cheek, an act of courage in itself. 'I was the only other member of the British 
delegation close enough to hear her one-word comment', Brenchley later recollected, 'which 
interestingly was "Judas"'. Brown said nothing in reply.
38
 
 Brown's blunt approach on the question of Israeli withdrawal stood in marked contrast 
to the more circumspect line adopted by President Johnson, who had outlined five principles 
for peace in the Middle East in a speech delivered in Washington DC rather than at the UN in 
New York on 19 June.
39
 The first and most important was that 'every nation in the area has a 
fundamental right to live, and to have this right respected by its neighbours.' The second was 
'justice for the refugees'. The third was respect for maritime rights. The fourth was the danger 
presented by the Middle East arms race which he proposed might be controlled by all UN 
members reporting arms shipments to the region. The fifth was the 'importance of respect for 
political independence and territorial integrity of all the states of the area.' All nations in the 
region needed 'recognized boundaries and other arrangements that will give them security 
against terror, destruction, and war.' On Jerusalem, Johnson called merely for 'adequate 
recognition of the special interest of three great religions in the holy places of Jerusalem.'
40
 
The question of withdrawal was addressed only indirectly through the references to territorial 
integrity for all states and the need for recognized boundaries. 
 The Anglo-American differences signalled by Brown's and Johnson's speeches 
became more fully apparent as the question of the status of Jerusalem moved to the forefront 
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of debate at the special General Assembly session at the beginning of July. This followed the 
approval by the Israeli Knesset on 27 June of three bills authorising the extension of Israeli 
law and administration to occupied Arab territory which fell within the borders of the former 
Palestine mandate. Under the auspices of this general enabling legislation Israel issued a 
decree extending Israeli law to East Jerusalem.
41
 While both Washington and London took 
the public stance that the Israeli action was illegal under international law, and that as an 
occupying power Israel was required to use existing law as the basis for its administration, 
the litmus test of the positions of both countries was provided by a resolution now introduced 
by Pakistan at the UN General Assembly. This expressed deep concern at measures taken by 
Israel to change the status of the city, describing them as 'invalid'. It also called on Israel to 
rescind all such measures already taken and to 'desist forthwith from taking any action which 
would alter the status of Jerusalem'.
42
 The resolution put the Johnson Administration in a 
quandary. Whilst it opposed unilateral Israeli actions in Jerusalem it regarded the wording of 
the resolution as too strong. In London by contrast, given the fact that Brown had been the 
first to raise the issue of Jerusalem in blunt terms, there was no such dilemma. When 
resolution 2253 came to a vote on 4 July it passed with 99 votes in favour, including that of 
Britain, 20 abstentions, including that of the United States, and none against. 
 The position in terms of Anglo-American relations was made more difficult a week 
later as Pakistan floated a second resolution (2254) condemning Israel's failure to comply 
with the first resolution (2253). The wording of resolution 2254 was even stronger, 
expressing the 'deepest regret and concern' at Israel's non-compliance and stating that the 
General Assembly 'deplores the failure of Israel to implement General Assembly resolution 
2253'.
43
 The forceful wording of the resolution brought Anglo-American differences even 
more to the fore. In a discussion between Caradon and Goldberg, the US Ambassador made it 
clear that any resolution which included condemnation of Israel should be ruled out. Caradon 
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for his part underlined that he did not share this view, a case he also argued forcefully in 
communications with the Foreign Office in London.
44
 The main reason for Goldberg's 
approach was elucidated in a memo written to President Johnson by his Special Assistant for 
National Security Affairs, Walt Rostow. The US should abstain again on the second 
resolution, Goldberg had argued, because 'in his judgement, the Jewish community here 
would be up in arms if we switched.'
45
 
  In the event resolution 2254 was also passed by the General Assembly, this time with 
99 votes in favour and only 18 abstentions. Once again the British delegation voted in favour 
while the US abstained. The Administration was sufficiently discomfited by the US's relative 
isolation for Secretary of State Rusk to issue an explanatory statement which balanced the 
US's deep regret at the administrative actions taken by Israel with its recognition of the 'deep 
emotional concerns' which motivated the people and government of Israel.
46
 This reflected 
the advice to the President from both Walt Rostow and his special consultant McGeorge 
Bundy to the effect that the US needed to 'balance our accounts somewhat with the moderate 
Arabs'. Reflecting the divisions within the Administration, and his recognition of Goldberg's 
reputation with the Arabs, Rostow also reported candidly to the President Bundy's view 
(which he evidently shared) that 'Amb. Goldberg cannot really swing it politically.'
47
 
 If the voting over these resolutions at the General Assembly was a public illustration 
of the gap between the UK and US positions, as well as a private illustration of the factors 
which shaped US policy, similar differences were also evident in the covert diplomacy of the 
peace process. At a meeting with King Hussein of Jordan in London on 3 July, both Brown 
and Prime Minister Harold Wilson had expressed their serious doubts about the King's 
suggestion that he might be willing to pursue covert, bilateral negotiations with Israel.
48
 
According to Brown, 'the King had shown himself by his recent behaviour to be one of the 
bravest men alive: but he believed that that King could not afford, without serious risk to 
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himself to take any position in regard to Israel which put him too far ahead of his Arab 
colleagues in other countries.'
49
 Ten days later, however, the King approached both the 
American and British Ambassadors in Amman to tell them he had decided to take the plunge 
and pursue a bilateral settlement with Israel.
50
 The King's initiative was given the immediate 
and enthusiastic backing of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who described it as 'a major act of 
courage' and an 'important breakthrough toward peace' in a telegram to Israeli Foreign 
Minister Abba Eban.
51
 This reflected the positive line taken by the State Department over 
Hussein's initiative. In London, Foreign Secretary Brown, in keeping with his earlier warning 
to Hussein, was much more sceptical. Brown referred to Hussein's approach as 'suicidal' and 
also described the American response as 'dangerously and unnecessarily precipitate'.
52
 
The Anglo-American differences in approach crystallised over the State Department's 
decision to convey the positive Israeli response to Hussein's initiative back to the King via the 
US Ambassador to Jordan, Findley Burns. Brown was both 'intensely irritated' at the lack of 
consultation over this US decision and deeply sceptical as to its merits.
53
 According to US 
Ambassador to London David Bruce, 'Brown was emphatic about his belief that Israel is not 
anxious, is indeed perhaps unwilling, to negotiate seriously with Hussein.'
54
 Given what we 
now know from Israeli sources Brown's scepticism about the Israeli Cabinet's willingness to 
negotiate in good faith with Hussein at this juncture was well placed.
55
 These Anglo-
American differences were reported by Walt Rostow, special assistant for National Security 
Affairs, to the President.
56
 Secretary Rusk's position was that the US was 'not at this time 
playing [a] much greater role than mailman' and was not specifically endorsing the initiative 
by conveying the Israeli reply.
57
 However, in keeping with the muddle which characterised 
the State Department's approach, this stood in contrast to Gene Rostow's earlier description of 
the US's policy as one of 'giving things a push at one remove'.
58
 Rostow even claimed that 
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divisions in the Israeli Cabinet might result in a more flexible negotiating position on their 
part if Hussein now pressed ahead.
59
 
The disjointed reaction to Hussein's initiative within the Administration prompted a 
remarkable and candid private memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to the President. Bundy 
underlined the chaotic approach to decision-making in the State Department, caused largely 
by Gene Rostow's combination of activism and disorganisation. However, Bundy also 
obliquely criticised Secretary of State Rusk who had asked Rostow to take on tasks which 
Bundy believed should fall within the remit of Under Secretary of State Nick Katzenbach or 
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Luke Battle. 'I find it embarrassing to 
have to bring this matter to you, but I honestly don’t know what else to do', Bundy wrote. 'My 
own reluctant judgment is that there is no substitute for a direct decision that Gene Rostow 
and his Control Group are to be ended…' Bundy diagnosed the cause of earlier hesitation to 
dismiss Rostow from this role as 'a belief that the American Jewish community would be 
suspicious of this decision.' But he felt this problem could be overcome since Rostow's likely 
replacement, Under Secretary of State Nick Katzenbach, was 'not a man they mistrust and he 
has the good sense and judgment of a sticky continuing situation which Gene simply does not 
have.' Bundy concluded by indicating that Secretary of Defense McNamara strongly agreed 
with him on this matter.
60
 
In the event, the President once again took no direct action against Gene Rostow who 
retained his coordinating role. The Anglo-American differences which had been exacerbated 
by the incoherence of US policy-making were not tested further at this juncture since Hussein 
himself now drew the conclusion that the time was not in fact ripe for a formal attempt at 
bilateral negotiation. However, the exchanges over Hussein's putative peace initiative do 
serve to illustrate the greater degree of scepticism in London about Israel's willingness to 
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negotiate a settlement, as well as the relative incoherence of US policy-making towards the 
peace process. 
 Through the summer, Gene Rostow continued his campaign to promote the prospects 
for bilateral negotiations between Hussein and Israeli leaders, returning to the theme once 
again in discussions with British interlocutors in September. In the wake of the conference of 
Arab Heads of State convened in Khartoum at the end of August, he told the British 
Ambassador in Washington Sir Patrick Dean that Israeli Foreign Minister Eban had indicated 
the time might now be right for a secret meeting. Once again, Rostow argued that there was 
danger in delay and that King Hussein should be encouraged to be more forthcoming. Dean 
noted in his report of Rostow's views that he may have been unduly influenced by the Israeli 
Ambassador in Washington and that his comments did not reflect the mood elsewhere in the 
State Department which was one of 'resentment against the increasingly negative attitude of 
the Israelis at a time when the Arabs are showing signs of flexibility'.
61
 From Tel Aviv, the 
British Ambassador Michael Hadow, normally a sympathetic reporter of Israeli views, noted 
that opinion was hardening regarding the territorial situation as time went by. According to 
Hadow, Foreign Minister Eban's approach was to 'continue to give the appearance of more 
flexibility in his exchanges with the Americans than is warranted by his ability to "deliver" 
his Cabinet colleagues.'
62
 
Rostow reiterated his views in discussions at the Foreign Office in London on 14 
September, but met with a frosty response. 'We see no evidence yet for Mr Rostow's 
optimism about a "reasonable deal" being possible at the moment', noted Foreign Secretary 
Brown.
63
 In conversation with Ambassador Dean after his return to Washington Rostow 
indicated that King Hussein had told US Ambassador Burns in Amman that if there was no 
progress towards a settlement at the UN during October, then 'the Jordanians would be 
prepared to enter into secret talks with the Israelis in either New York or Washington.'
64
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However, the British soon discovered that Rostow's account of the conversation was a 
misrepresentation. When UK Ambassador Adams questioned his US counterpart Ambassador 
Burns about the report, he was told that the King had not in fact indicated that it was his 
definite intention to enter into secret talks with the Israelis if no progress was made at the 
UN, but rather that there was a possibility he might feel himself forced to take that step. 
Given Rostow's earlier attempts to promote such covert talks, this misrepresentation was 
more likely a deliberate rather than an accidental misreading of the report from Amman.
65
 At 
any rate, it served once again to highlight the confusion surrounding US policy-making from 
the British perspective. 
 If Gene Rostow's encouragement of covert Israeli-Jordanian talks, which were likely 
to be an unproductive and insubstantial exercise in prevarication, was one illustration of a 
pro-Israel bias in US policy-making at this juncture, at the UN, Ambassador Goldberg's foot-
dragging over further moves to promote a Security Council resolution during September and 
October was a further such illustration. Goldberg's approach was an additional source of 
tension in Anglo-American relations. Both Caradon and Dean believed that Goldberg had 
adopted a consistently pessimistic attitude about the chances of making progress and that his 
own preference was for 'not taking initiatives and for letting events take their course'.
66
 
However, the British continued to hope that despite Goldberg's political influence and his 
direct access to the president, Secretary of State Dean Rusk's views, which they saw as being 
closer to their own, might prevail over the framing of a Security Council resolution. 
 Nevertheless, it would be an unwarranted over-simplification of US policy-making to 
suggest that Goldberg and Gene Rostow were both reading from the same script sympathetic 
to the Israeli position, while Rusk followed another line, more similar to that of the British 
government. The confusion on the US side was such that although both Goldberg and Rostow 
probably did entertain the same underlying pro-Israel sympathies, there was frequently 
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tension between the two men. The reason for this was straightforward. Goldberg wanted to 
exercise leadership in the formation and implementation of US policy from New York and 
resisted any attempt by the State Department, whether by Rusk or Rostow, to usurp this role 
from Washington.
67
 Rostow's activism was therefore resented by "the Justice". Talks between 
British and American officials in Washington in mid-August had served to highlight the 
tension between the two men, a theme which became a refrain of British reporting throughout 
the autumn.
68
 The British tried to tread a delicate line, using their contacts in the State 
Department to gain a sense of how representative Goldberg's views were of the 
Administration's policy, while at the same time trying to avoid the appearance of going 
behind the Ambassador's back to the State Department. They did not always succeed. At one 
particularly tense juncture in early October, Goldberg called in Lord Caradon to treat him to a 
direct and colourful rebuttal of comments offered by Rostow to British officials in 
Washington over the modalities of a return to the Security Council for the consideration of a 
possible resolution.
69
 
 It was during November, in the final phase of the negotiations which ultimately led to 
the passage of resolution 242, that the differences in the US and UK approaches already 
outlined became more important. In short, because of the distinctive British position on the 
key issue of withdrawal, the UK delegation led by Caradon was much better placed to draft a 
final resolution which would bring the Arab states and their supporters in the Security 
Council on board. As the senior NSC staffer responsible for the Middle East, Harold 
Saunders, put it a fortnight before resolution 242 was passed, 'in spite of Ambassador 
Goldberg's best efforts, obviously the Arabs distrust him with a passion.'
70
 Caradon, by 
contrast, had won the respect and trust of all parties. 
The crucial juncture in terms of the launching of a British initiative, came at the end 
of the first week of November by which stage there were two key resolutions in play in the 
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Security Council: a non-aligned/Indian draft which was unacceptable to Israel and a US draft 
which was unacceptable to the Arabs. As far as the key Arab delegations of Egypt and Jordan 
were concerned, the US draft championed by Goldberg was insufficiently explicit on the 
question of Israeli withdrawal. Arab dissatisfaction with the US draft mingled with their 
ingrained distrust of Goldberg's personal role. As Foreign Secretary Brown wrote to 
Ambassador Dean in Washington, 'the Arab attitude towards Mr Goldberg is disturbing if not 
surprising. It cannot be to the advantage of the United States or strengthen their influence, 
that he should appear to them to be arm-twisting to such an extent at Israeli behest.'
71
 
On 3 November, Caradon first tentatively floated the idea of introducing a British 
draft resolution in a telegram to Brown, in which he also underlined the potential risks of this 
course of action. The UK might incur the displeasure of supporters of other drafts including 
the US in what risked amounting to no more than a quixotic operation.
72
 Nevertheless, 
Caradon followed up on his suggestion with a draft text sent to Brown on 4 November, which 
was very similar in form and wording to the eventual text of resolution 242.
73
 In terms of 
Anglo-American relations Caradon now had to play a very delicate hand for on the same day 
as he despatched his own draft to Brown, Goldberg made a bid for British support for a new 
US draft resolution. Goldberg hoped in particular that if the UK would associate itself with 
the US draft it might help persuade King Hussein of Jordan to accept the text. Caradon 
prevaricated in the face of this request telling Goldberg that he would have to consult London 
before giving any firm answer, although indicating that his personal opinion was that 'it 
would be better that the United Kingdom should not be associated with the new American 
text.'
74
 
In London, Foreign Secretary Brown chose his words equally carefully when faced 
with a direct request delivered by Ambassador Bruce for British support for the US 
resolution. He told Bruce that it represented a substantial move on the part of the United 
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States but noted in a telegram to Caradon that he had not committed himself on co-
sponsorship and would not decide on the matter until he knew the reactions of Hussein and 
the Israelis.
75
 It soon became apparent that what now concerned King Hussein the most was 
not the wording of the US draft text addressing the issue of withdrawal, but what the Johnson 
Administration understood that text to mean and what action it would take to implement it.
76
 
To help assuage Hussein's doubts, Jack O'Connell, the CIA station chief in Amman and a 
qualified international lawyer, who had been drafted to Goldberg's staff to act as a go-
between to the King, now prepared a formal document which confirmed that 'the United 
States is prepared to support a return of the West Bank to Jordan with minor boundary 
rectifications.'
77
 The King asked for assurances that the US would implement this 
commitment from Goldberg, Rusk and the President in turn.
78
 However, he evidently 
remained unconvinced by their responses, not least by the President's observation that 'it was 
difficult to be precise in one part and not on the others. There were imprecise statements in 
the resolution in several respects.'
79
 For his part the King pointed out that if he were to 
support the US resolution, he would be sacrificing 'the previous Arab insistence on certain 
resolution language which they felt protected their position in return for a promise from the 
US G[overnment].'
80
 
Evidently, the trust in US intentions needed for King Hussein to make this leap of 
faith was lacking. This issue of trust, more than the semantics of the wording on withdrawal, 
was the key reason why King Hussein did not signal his acceptance of the US draft. In the 
background, Caradon, an interlocutor whom the King did trust, was now working to clarify 
the as yet still private UK text in ways which might attract the King. These encompassed the 
separation of the withdrawal provision from the 'peace' provision in the text, and the addition 
of the words 'occupied in the recent conflict' to specify from which territories withdrawal 
should take place. His purpose as outlined to Foreign Secretary Brown was 'to ensure that our 
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new draft cannot be claimed as simply the American draft in a different guise'.
81
 Caradon 
recognised that launching this UK initiative would make Goldberg, who had staked his 
personal prestige on securing the passage of the US resolution, 'a good deal upset'. However, 
he argued that 'I think I know him well enough to explain to him very frankly that we must 
have a line of our own'.
82
 Apart from any other consideration the choice between backing the 
US resolution or the non-aligned/Indian resolution would create a difficult dilemma for the 
British government. The Indian draft was in fact closer to the British position but voting for 
it, or even abstaining if it came to a vote, would constitute a significant snub to the United 
States.
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On 10 November Brown authorised Caradon formally to launch the British 
initiative.
84
 In a difficult interview with Goldberg the following morning, Caradon explained 
the British position. 'Brits have thought it best to maintain independent position, commit UK 
to no text and leave way open for UK to come forward with helpful move or compromise', 
Goldberg reported to Rusk. "The Justice" was not amused, and told Caradon that 'his efforts 
would interfere with our efforts if he went ahead, even to discuss UK text with Eban, before 
we received a definite reply from King [Hussein].'
85
 However, despite agreeing to wait for 
King Hussein's response to Goldberg before disclosing the British initiative, Caradon went 
ahead and discussed it with both Eban and Hussein regardless. Eban's initial response to the 
British draft was tough and unwelcoming as Caradon had expected. It would be 'impossible 
for Israel to live with such a text', Eban told him.
86
 When Caradon met Hussein alone later 
the same day he found the King, who had almost reached the end of his tether, 'very tired and 
disturbed'.
87
 Nevertheless, he responded positively to the possibility of a British compromise 
resolution which Caradon also discussed with him in personal confidence. The effect of 
Caradon's initiative was to kill off any remaining possibility that the King might give his 
personal backing to Goldberg's draft resolution. 
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There remained considerable obstacles in the way of the British resolution gaining the 
acquiescence of all parties, as emphasised by the formal Israeli response delivered by Eban to 
Caradon the following day. The British had 'extracted with pliers the four or five things in the 
American text which made it supportable for them', Eban complained. 'Anything worse for 
Israel than the American resolution would be quite unacceptable.'
88
 To add to Caradon's 
problems, the Latin American members of the Security Council, Argentina and Brazil, now 
proceeded to cut across the British initiative by preparing their own compromise draft text 
which Caradon expected to be seized on by the Arabs as more sympathetic to their position.
89
 
Nevertheless, the prospect of a more unfavourable Latin American resolution gaining Arab 
support at least helped shift the US position, with Goldberg now encouraging Caradon to go 
ahead with the British initiative.
90
 The prospect that the Latin American draft might get 
majority support on the Security Council also encouraged the Israelis to look again at the 
British text.
91
 
By 16 November Goldberg was actively encouraging Caradon to table the British 
resolution, with a promise that 'the Americans would give us all the help they could, 
including pressure on the Israelis.'
92
 With King Hussein also working to secure President 
Nasser's backing for the British resolution, Foreign Secretary Brown felt able to send a 
cautious congratulatory telegram to Caradon: 'you and your team have done a magnificent 
job. No flannel. Congratulations. Let's keep our fingers crossed.'
93
 The shift in the US 
approach put the Israeli government in a difficult position. British Ambassador Hadow's 
judgement from Tel Aviv was that Israel was still 'counting on getting away without any 
resolution at all. They will be in an awkward dilemma if our present text is adopted with 
American support.'
94
 From a Machiavellian point of view, Hadow judged that the Israelis 
might be better served by the success of the Latin American resolution since they could then 
safely reject it with American support. 
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At this late stage another key variable came to the fore in Caradon's calculations: the 
position of the Soviet delegation led by deputy Foreign Minister Vasili Kuznetsov. On the 
afternoon of Friday 17 November, Kuznetsov insisted on a delay in bringing the British 
resolution to a vote until the beginning of the following week. Caradon was anxious, fearing 
that 'Latin American and other rats may get at the resolution over the weekend.'
95
 Moreover, 
it was unclear to Caradon for what purpose Kuznetsov had requested the delay. In fact, 
unbeknown to Caradon, a high level exchange of notes now took place over the weekend 
between Soviet Premier Kosygin and President Johnson. Its apparent purpose from the Soviet 
side was to make sure that full Soviet support for the Arab position on withdrawal was on the 
record. A draft resolution couched in terms overwhelmingly favourable to the Arab position 
was appended to Kosygin's letter.
96
 In response President Johnson underlined the need for a 
resolution to be passed which both sides found tolerable. To that end he solicited Soviet 
support for the United Kingdom draft.
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When Kuznetsov proceeded to table this Soviet draft on Monday 20 November, 
Caradon confronted him, accusing him of a 'wrecking operation'.
98
 However, Kuznetsov 
assured him 'most earnestly that he wished to work for peace in the Middle East'. He insisted 
that he was not trying to undermine the British initiative. Nevertheless, he now requested a 
further 48 hours delay in bringing the British resolution to a vote. With the prospect of a rival 
Latin American compromise resolution having now seemingly been averted through intensive 
British and American lobbying, the Soviet resolution represented the major remaining 
obstacle in Caradon's path. He at once protested the Soviet move to Kuznetsov, but again the 
deputy Foreign Minister 'promised… that there was no trick in this and speaking very 
earnestly he begged me to agree to the postponement for 48 hours, assuring me that this 
would be for the good.'
99
 Caradon hoped that the Soviet move represented no more than 'a 
face-saver, to show that the Russians did their best for the Arab cause', but still feared the 
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possibility that it was 'part of a wrecking operation which we must do our utmost to defeat.'
100
 
Goldberg for his part was convinced that the Soviet move was a 'spoiling operation'.
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There was still time for one more pirouette from the Soviets in the diplomatic dance 
leading up to the 22 November Security Council session. On the afternoon of 21 November 
the Soviet Ambassador in Washington Anatoliy Dobrynin presented another letter from 
Premier Kosygin requesting an urgent response from President Johnson that same day. 
Kosygin's letter stated somewhat tautologically that the USSR would 'not oppose the 
acceptance of the British draft if, of course, it is acceptable to the Arabs.'
102
 In his immediate 
reply President Johnson expressed the hope that 'you can join the broad consensus of the 
Security Council by voting for the United Kingdom resolution tomorrow.'
103
 
Not having been privy to these secret Soviet-American exchanges,
104
 the day before 
the vote Caradon expected that the Soviets would almost certainly abstain. 'A consensus is 
still conceivable but very unlikely', he wrote to Foreign Secretary Brown.
105
 In the end, when 
the resolution came to a vote on 22 November, all fifteen hands, or more accurately fourteen 
hands and Kuznetsov's index finger, were raised in favour of the British resolution.
106
 The 
Soviet vote, according to Caradon, was 'an act of political courage' largely attributable to 
Kuznetsov's work.
107
 Caradon's view was that it was Kuznetsov's personal intervention which 
had ultimately led to the withdrawal of the Soviet resolution and the vote in favour of the 
British resolution.
108
 In Washington, less favourable interpretations of Soviet actions were 
circulating to the effect that the Soviets had only backed down when it became clear that 
Nasser was willing to accept the British resolution.
109
 One way or another, relations with the 
Arab states were most likely at the core of Soviet diplomacy over the Security Council 
resolution. Whether or not the Soviet leadership misjudged the degree of Arab flexibility, it is 
clear that for political purposes they wanted to have on record a draft resolution which re-
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affirmed their support for the Arab position on Israeli withdrawal from the occupied 
territories. 
Viewed more broadly, despite the unpromising backdrop in terms of the devastating 
defeat of its Arab allies in the June war, the Soviet Union had played a constructive post-war 
role in the search for a resolution which might provide the basis for an Arab-Israeli peace 
process. The unanimous passing of resolution 242 was a significant indication of the fact that 
the United Nations Security Council was not permanently paralysed by East-West rivalry 
during the Cold War era. Indeed, as Caradon reflected, it was a triumph for multilateral 
diplomacy. Even the Latin American draft text introduced during the final stages of debate 
had in fact proved ultimately helpful by underlining the relative impartiality of the British 
resolution. The successful passing of the resolution was due to the genuine desire of all 
parties to find common ground and, in Caradon's view, reflected credit on the Security 
Council as a whole.
110
 
For British diplomacy, as Brown put it in a congratulatory message to Caradon: 'this 
is a magnificent outcome which indeed surpasses all our hopes when the operation began.'
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While Caradon must take the credit for the skill and determination with which the final 
negotiations were conducted, the position Brown had staked out at the General Assembly 
meeting in June, and his efforts to cultivate relations with the key Arab leaders, President 
Nasser and King Hussein, provided the essential backdrop to the British achievement. Indeed, 
it is no coincidence that the process of Anglo-Egyptian dialogue, initiated by Brown but 
interrupted by the June war, had culminated in the announcement of the restoration of formal 
diplomatic relations between Britain and Egypt on 19 November, just before resolution 242 
was passed.
112
 The successful passage of resolution 242 was a clear indication of the fact that 
the skills of individual ministers and diplomats are vital in the conduct of international 
relations. Without Caradon and Brown it is doubtful that resolution 242 would have been 
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framed, defended and passed, and without resolution 242 there would have been no 
benchmark for the subsequent Arab-Israeli peace process. 
In terms of Anglo-American relations, the immediate picture was much more mixed. 
While Secretary of State Dean Rusk wrote a personal note of congratulation to Foreign 
Secretary Brown once the result of the Security Council debate was known, the atmosphere at 
the United Nations in New York was more troubled. As Ambassador Dean in Washington 
noted, 'if there is a feeling that perhaps the Americans did not really deserve many thanks for 
the outcome of the Middle East Debate in the Security Council I would only say that the 
difficulties were in New York and not here and Rusk's influence was certainly very helpful 
throughout.'
113
 These bureaucratic rivalries, which shaped the US approach after the June 
war, particularly the dominating role played by Ambassador Goldberg, made it difficult for 
the Johnson Administration to exercise effective leadership in the search for peace in the 
Middle East. The British success in sponsoring resolution 242, therefore, was on one level a 
measure of the failure of US policy. 
The resolution 242 episode also points to some broader conclusions which might be 
drawn about the conduct of Anglo-American relations from a British perspective. The Middle 
East diplomacy of the Wilson government, especially that of Foreign Secretary Brown, shows 
that the UK was better placed to achieve significant and lasting diplomatic success when it 
maintained its freedom of action vis-à-vis the US, rather than having its hands tied by the 
'special relationship'. What might be termed the consultative but not constrained or craven 
approach adopted by Brown and Caradon proved to be a successful model for British 
diplomacy towards the United States. 
More broadly, it is arguable that the Anglo-American diplomacy surrounding 
resolution 242 helped set the pattern for the next two decades of British diplomacy and 
Anglo-American relations over the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Heath government maintained a 
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similar approach, with the tone set by Foreign Secretary Alec Douglas-Home's Harrogate 
speech of 31 October 1970, which underlined the need for full implementation of resolution 
242. Likewise during the October 1973 war, the Heath government kept its distance from the 
Nixon Administration and maintained its freedom of manoeuvre as the crisis unfolded.
114
 
Even the Conservative governments of Margaret Thatcher maintained an independent policy 
from 1979 onwards, with Thatcher acting as a persistent, often unwelcome, advocate in 
Washington of credible Palestinian representation in the peace process.
115
 
However, if successive British governments maintained their own line over the Arab-
Israeli conflict, the passage of resolution 242 nevertheless represented the end of an era in 
terms of Britain playing the leading great power role in the search peace in the region. 
Henceforth it would be the United States which would act as the principal external sponsor of 
the peace process. In that sense it is no small irony that resolution 242 was passed almost 
precisely half a century after the promulgation of the Balfour Declaration in November 1917. 
What Elizabeth Monroe memorably dubbed Britain's 'moment in the Middle East' might 
appropriately be bracketed by these two ambiguous, but portentous pieces of British 
diplomatic draughtsmanship.
116
 
                                                          
1
 William. Roger Louis, 'The Ghost of Suez and Resolution 242', in William Roger Louis, 
and Avi Shlaim, The 1967 Arab-Israeli War: Origins and Consequences (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 234 , 235, 241. 
2
 United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, quoted from Arthur Lall, The UN and the 
Middle East Crisis, 1967 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 308-9. 
3
 For the backdrop to devaluation see: Steven G. Galpern, Money, Oil and Empire in the 
Middle East: Sterling and Post-War Imperialism, 1944-1971 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 268-86; Kevin Boyle, ‘The Price of Peace: Vietnam, the Pound and 
the Crisis of the American Empire’, Diplomatic History, xxvii (2003), 37-72; Samuel Brittan, 
30 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
‘The 1967 Devaluation’, Contemporary Record, i (1987), 44-53. On the East of Suez 
decision see Saki Dockrill, Britain’s Retreat from East of Suez: the Choice between Europe 
and the World, 1945-68 (New York: Palgrave, 2002); Peter Caterall (ed.), ‘The East of Suez 
Decisions’, Contemporary Record, vii (1993), 612-53; Philip Darby, British Defence Policy 
East of Suez,1947-68 (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1973); Jeffrey 
Pickering, Britain’s Withdrawal from East of Suez: the Politics of Retrenchment (New York: 
St Martin’s Press, 1998). 
4
 For Anglo-American relations over the Vietnam War see: Jonathan Colman, A ‘Special 
Relationship? Harold Wilson, Lyndon B. Johnson and Anglo-American Relations ‘at the 
Summit’, 1964-68 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004); Sylvia Ellis, Britain, 
America and the Vietnam War (Westport: Praeger, 2004) and ‘Lyndon Johnson, Harold 
Wilson and the Vietnam War: a Not so Special Relationship?’ in Jonathan Hollowell (ed), 
Twentieth Century Anglo-American Relations (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), 180-200, John 
Young, ‘Britain and LBJ’s War, 1964-1968’ Cold War History, ii (2002), 63-92. 
5
 Record of a telephone conversation between the Prime Minister and President Johnson at 
3.15am, 11 February 1965, PREM13/692, The United Kingdom National Archives [hereafter 
TNA]. 
6
 Message from President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson, 11 January 1968, document 
289, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XII, Western Europe 
[hereafter FRUS] (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2001), 608-9. 
7
 Works which consider British policy in the Middle East and Anglo-American relations 
during this period include: Frank Brenchley, Britain, the Six-Day War and its Aftermath 
(London: I. B. Tauris, 2005); Moshe Gat, Britain and the Conflict in the Middle East, 1964-
67: The Coming of the Six-Day War (Westport: Praeger, 2003); Robert McNamara, Britain, 
Nasser and the Balance of Power in the Middle East, 1952-1967 (London: Frank Cass, 
31 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
2003); Tore T. Petersen, The Decline of the Anglo-American Middle East: A Willing Retreat, 
1961-69 (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2006); Simon C. Smith, Ending Empire in the 
Middle East: Britain, the United States and Post-War Decolonization, 1945-73 (London: 
Routledge, 2012); William Roger Louis, 'The Ghost of Suez and Resolution 242', in William 
Roger Louis and Avi Shlaim (eds), The 1967 Arab-Israeli War: Origins and Consequences 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 219-46; and William Roger Louis, ‘Legacy 
of the Balfour Declaration: Palestine, 1967-1973, in Zach Levey and Elie Podeh (eds), 
Britain and the Middle East: From Imperial Power to Junior Partner (Brighton: Sussex 
Academic Press, 2008), 108-30. 
8
 Sydney D. Bailey, The Making of Resolution 242 (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
1985), 146, 159. Goldberg’s biographer, David L. Stebenne, goes further still, describing 
resolution 242 as ‘largely Goldberg’s handiwork’ (Arthur J. Goldberg: New Deal Liberal 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 354-55). See also Seymour Maxwell Finger, 
American Ambassadors at the UN: People, Politics and Bureaucracy in Making Foreign 
Policy (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1988), 185, for the same claim. 
9
 Brenchley, Britain, the Six Day War and its Aftermath, xv. 
10
 Letter, George Brown to King Hussein of Jordan, 5 March 1970, British File, Royal 
Hashemite Archives, Amman, Jordan. 
11
 Richard Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister: Volume Two: Lord President of the 
Council and Leader of the House of Commons 1966-68 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1976), 
394-5. 
12
 Brenchley, Britain, the Six-Day War and its Aftermath, xvi. 
13
 ibid, xvii. 
14
 Louis, 'The Ghost of Suez and Resolution 242', 239; Bailey, The Making of Resolution 242, 
176. 
32 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
15
 Brenchley, Britain, the Six-Day War and its Aftermath, 57, 59. Wilson's Zionism is 
evidenced by his book, The Chariot of Israel: Britain, America and the State of Israel 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1981), published after he left office. 
16
 For Kaufman's later description of his role see: 
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/resources/commentary-and-analysis/1571-michael-
white-in-conversation-with-sir-gerald-kaufman-mp (accessed 26 September 2014) 
17
 Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister: Volume Two, 392-5. 
18
 For example, Wilson passed on details about a trilateral meeting between King Hussein, 
George Brown and himself on 3 July 1967 via Kaufman to the Israelis (Avi Shlaim, Lion of 
Jordan: The Life of King Hussein in War and Peace (London: Allen Lane, 2007), 265). 
19
 Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), 
297. 
20
 Finger, American Ambassadors at the UN, 160. 
21
 Jack O'Connell with Vernon Loeb, King's Counsel: A Memoir of War, Espionage, and 
Diplomacy in the Middle East (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2011), 72. 
22
 Brown's annotation on Hayman to Brenchley, 'The Middle East and the United Nations', 10 
October 1967, FCO17/529, TNA. 
23 For further discussion of the role and organisation of the State Department during this 
period see: William I. Bacchus, Foreign Policy and the Bureaucratic Process: The State 
Department’s Country Director System (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974); John 
Franklin Campbell, The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory (New York: Basic Books, 1971); 
John P. Leacacos, Fires in the In-Basket: The ABC’s of the State Department (Cleveland: 
World Publishing Co., 1968); Frederick C. Mosher and John E. Harr, Programming Systems 
and Foreign Affairs Leadership: An Attempted Innovation (New York and Oxford: OUP, 
1970); Smith Simpson, Anatomy of the State Department (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967); 
33 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Donald P. Warwick, Marvin Meade and Theodore Reed, A Theory of Public Bureaucracy: 
Politics, Personality and Organization in the State Department (Cambridge, MA and 
London: Harvard University Press, 1975). 
24
 Harold H. Saunders, Oral History interview, 15 September 1983, AC 05-01, Lyndon B. 
Johnson Library, Austin, Texas [hereafter LBJL]. 
25
 For discussion of Brown's attempts at détente with Nasser see McNamara, Britain, Nasser 
and the Balance of Power in the Middle East, 233-7. 
26
 Telegram, Cairo to State, 4 March 1967, document 393, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol.XVIII. 
27
 Memorandum of Conversation, 26 May 1967, document 77, FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume 
XIX, 143. 
28
 Letter from President Johnson to Prime Minister Eshkol, 3 June 1967, document 139, 
FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XIX, 264. For further discussion of the shift in the U.S. position 
during the week before the outbreak of war see: William Quandt, ‘Lyndon Johnson and the 
June 1967 War: What Color was the Light?’, Middle East Journal, xlvi (1992), 228; Nigel J. 
Ashton, 'For King and Country: Jack O'Connell, the CIA and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1963-
71', Diplomatic History, xxxvi (2012), 893-7; Peter L. Hahn, ‘The Cold War and the Six Day 
War: US policy towards the Arab-Israeli Crisis of June 1967’, in Nigel J. Ashton (ed), The 
Cold War in the Middle East: Regional Conflict and the Superpowers, 1967-73 (New York, 
2007), 23-5; Moshe Gat, ‘Let Someone Else Do the Job: American Policy on the Eve of the 
Six Day War’, Diplomacy & Statecraft, xiv (2003), 131-58. 
29
 For the meeting of officials see: Record of a Meeting in the White House on 2 June 1967, 
PREM13/1906, TNA; and Memorandum of Conversation, 11.30-1.15pm, 2 June 1967, 
document 130, FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XIX, 237-44. The only available record of the 
Wilson-Johnson conversation is contained in Wilson's telegram to Brown reporting the 
meeting, UKUN to Foreign Office, telegram no.1202, 3 June 1967, PREM13/1906, TNA. 
34 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
30
 Memorandum, Rostow to Johnson, 1.00pm, 2 June 1967, National Security File, Memos to 
the President, Walt Rostow, Box 17, Folder Volume 30, June 1-12 1967 [3 of 4], LBJL. The 
record of the Evron approach is in Rostow to Johnson, 12.45pm, 2 June 1967, National 
Security File, Country File, Box 107, Folder MEC Vol.III Memos and Misc [2 of 3], LBJL.  
31
 Nigel Ashton, King Hussein of Jordan: A Political Life (London and New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2008), 119. 
32
 Text of King Hussein's interview with Pauline Fredericks on NBC's 'Today Show', 27 June 
1967, in FCO to Certain Missions, 28 June 1967, PREM13/1622, TNA. 
33
 Brenchley, Britain, the Six-Day War and its Aftermath, 54-60. 
34
 Memorandum, 'The General Assembly Debate', Nathaniel Davis to Walt Rostow, 21 June 
1967, National Security File, Country File, Box 110, Folder Middle East Crisis Vol.VII 
Memos and Misc [2 of 2] 6/67-7/67, LBJL. 
35
 Glass to Brown, 'The United Nations and the Arab/Israel Crisis: the Emergency Session of 
the General Assembly', 14 August 1967, FCO58/84, TNA. 
36
 Brenchley, Britain, the Six-Day War and its Aftermath, 55. 
37
 Full text of the Speech by the Secretary of State, the Rt. Hon. G. Brown M.P. to the 
General Assembly of the United Nations, 21 June 1967, FCO17/520. 
38
 Brenchley, Britain, the Six-Day War and its Aftermath, 56. 
39
 Bailey, The Making of Resolution 242, 114-15. 
40
 Editorial Note, document 308, FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XIX. 
41
 Arieh J. Kochavi, 'Jerusalem in Anglo-American Policy in the Immediate Wake of the June 
1967 War', Israel Affairs, xix (2013), 452-3. 
42
 Text of United Nations General Assembly resolution 2253, 'Measures taken by Israel to 
change the status of the City of Jerusalem', 4 July 1967, 
35 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/6798&Lang=E (accessed 20 
August 2014). 
43
 Text of United Nations General Assembly resolution 2254, 'Measures taken by Israel to 
change the status of the City of Jerusalem', 14 July 1967, 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/6798&Lang=E (accessed 20 
August 2014). 
44
 For Caradon's exchange with Goldberg see memorandum, Lambert to Morris, 12 July 
1967, FCO17/253, TNA. For Caradon's advocacy of British support for the second resolution 
(2254) see memorandum, 'Jerusalem', Lambert to Morris, 12 July 1967, and memorandum, 
'Jerusalem', Morris to Brenchley, 13 July 1967, ibid. 
45
 Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, 13 
July 1967, document 357, FRUS, 1968-68, Vol.XIX. 
46
 Kochavi, 'Jerusalem in Anglo-American Policy', 454. 
47
 Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, 13 
July 1967, document 357, FRUS, 1968-68, Vol.XIX. 
48
 Ironically, Hussein had already held his first post-war covert meeting with Yaacov Herzog, 
the director-general of Prime Minister Eshkol's office, the day before his meeting with 
Wilson and Brown. (Michael Bar-Zohar, Yaacov Herzog: A Biography (London: Halban 
Publishers, 2005), 300-5; Shlaim, Lion of Jordan, 259-64).  The meeting with Herzog was 
held at the home of his London physician, Dr Emmanuel Herbert. Wilson and Brown may 
already have been briefed about this meeting and the earlier establishment of the Herzog 
channel via Dr Herbert in London which dated back as far as 1963. The CIA station chief in 
Amman, Jack O'Connell, later observed that British Intelligence 'must have bugged that 
doctor's surgery and if they hadn't they weren't doing their job properly'. (Author's interview 
with Jack O'Connell, Washington D.C, 27 September 2007). 
36 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
49
 Record of a Conversation between the Prime Minister and the King of Jordan, 3 July 1967, 
FCO17/240, TNA. 
50
 For Hussein's approach to US Ambassador Burns see State to USUN, 13 July 1967, 
footnote 2, document 360, FRUS, 1964-68, Vol. XIX. His approach to British Ambassador 
Adams is confirmed in Foreign Office to Washington, telegram no.7915, 14 July 1967, 
PREM13/1622, TNA. 
51
 State to USUN, 13 July 1967, Document 360, FRUS, 1964-68, Vol. XIX. 
52
 Foreign Office to Washington, telegram no.7915, 14 July 1967, PREM13/1622, TNA. 
53
 State to London, 22 July 1967, NSF, Country File, Box 113, Folder MEC [1 of 2] 
Sandstorm/Whirlwind, LBJL. 
54
 London to State, 24 July 1967, NSF, Files of the Special Cttee of the NSC, Box 12, Folder 
Sandstorm [2 of 2], LBJL. For further discussion of Ambassador Bruce's role in Anglo-
American relations see: Raj Roy and John W. Young (eds.) Ambassador to Sixties London: 
The Diaries of David Bruce, 1961-9 (Dordrecht, Republic of Letters, 2009); and John W. 
Young, David Bruce and Diplomatic Practice: An American Ambassador in London, 1961-9 
(London: Bloombury, 2014). 
55
 For further discussion of the Israeli government’s position see Avi Raz, The Bride and the 
Dowry: Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians in the Aftermath of the June 1967 War (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2012). 
56
 Rostow to Johnson, 24 July 1967, NSF, Files of the Special Cttee of the NSC, Box 12, 
Folder Settlement [1 of 2], LBJL. 
57
 Rusk to Bruce, 25 July 1967, NSF, Country File, Box 113, Folder MEC [1 of 2] 
Sandstorm/Whirlwind, LBJL. 
58
 Washington to Foreign Office, telegram no.2428, 21 July 1967, PREM13/1622, TNA. 
59
 Washington to Foreign Office, telegram no.2438, 23 July 1967, ibid. 
37 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
60
 Memorandum, Bundy to the President, 25 July 1967, NSF, Files of the Special Committee 
of the NSC, Folder Minutes of Central Control Group Meetings, LBJL. 
61
 Washington to Foreign Office, telegram no.2861, 6 September 1967, PREM13/1623, TNA. 
62
 Tel Aviv to Foreign Office, telegram no.1012, 9 September 1967, ibid. 
63
 Foreign Office to Amman, telegram no.2059, 18 September 1967, ibid. 
64
 Washington to Foreign Office, telegram no.3006, 19 September 1967, FCO17/550, TNA. 
65
 Amman to Foreign Office, telegram no.1123, 21 September 1967, ibid. 
66
 Washington to Foreign Office, telegram no.3088, 29 September 1967, FCO17/527, TNA. 
67
 Washington to Foreign Office, telegram no.3409, 31 October 1967, FCO17/514, TNA.  
68
 See for example: Washington to Foreign Office, telegram no.2862, 6 September 1967, 
FCO17/513, TNA; Tomkins to Hope, 9 November 1967, and Hope to Tomkins, 14 
November 1967, FCO17/515, TNA. 
69
 UKUN to Foreign Office, telegram no.2614, 8 October 1967, FCO17/528, TNA. 
70
 Memorandum, Saunders to Rostow, 9 November 1967, NSF, Files of Harold H. Saunders, 
Box 25, Folder Middle East 11/1/67 – 12/31/67 [1 of 3], LBJL. 
71
 Foreign Office to Washington, 1 November 1967, telegram no.11440, FCO17/514, TNA. 
72
 UKUN to Foreign Office, 3 November 1967, telegram no.3000, ibid. 
73
 UKUN to Foreign Office, 4 November 1967, telegram no.3026, ibid. 
74
 UKUN to Foreign Office, 4 November 1967, telegram no.3022, ibid. 
75
 Foreign Office to UKUN, 5 November 1967, telegram no.5975, ibid. 
76
 The initial US draft, shared with Hussein and Caradon, affirmed that UN Charter principles 
required the 'withdrawal of armed forces from occupied territory' (UKUN to Foreign Office, 
4 November 1967, telegram no.3023, FCO17/514, TNA). The word 'territory' was amended 
to 'territories' in a subsequent draft in view of Hussein's concerns about the implementation of 
withdrawal (UKUN to Foreign Office, 6 November 1967, FCO17/514, TNA). 
38 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
77
 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel, 30 November 1968, 
document 506, FRUS, 1964-68, Volume XIX. A footnote to this document indicates that the 
original text could not be found by the editors of the volume. Jack O'Connell later expressed 
his firm conviction that the loss of the original document was deliberate (King's Counsel, 74-
5). 
78
 See: telegram from the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State, 6 
November 1967, document 507, FRUS, 1964-68, Volume XIX; telegram from the Department 
of State to the Mission to the United Nations, 8 November 1967, document 508, ibid; 
memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson, undated, document 513, 
ibid; memorandum for the files, 8 November 1967, document 515, ibid. 
79
 Memorandum for the files, 8 November 1967, document 515, ibid. 
80
 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel, 30 November 1968, 
document 506, ibid. 
81
 UKUN to Foreign Office, 7 November 1967, telegram no.3078, FCO17/514, TNA. 
82
 UKUN to Foreign Office, 9 November 1967, telegram no.3132, ibid. 
83
 Foreign Office to Washington 10 November 1967, telegram no.11847, ibid. 
84
 Foreign Office to UKUN, 10 November 1967, telegram no.6174, ibid. 
85
 Telegram from the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State, 11 November 
1967, document 517, FRUS, 1964-68, Volume XIX. 
86
 UKUN to Foreign Office, 11 November 1967, telegram no.3159, FCO17/515, TNA. 
87
 UKUN to Foreign Office, 11 November 1967, telegram no.3159, ibid. 
88
 UKUN to Foreign Office, 12 November 1967, telegram no.3163, ibid. 
89
 UKUN to Foreign Office, 13 November 1967, telegram no.3194, ibid. 
90
 UKUN to Foreign Office, 13 November 1967, telegram no.3193, ibid. 
91
 UKUN to Foreign Office, 14 November 1967, telegram no.3217, ibid. 
39 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
92
 UKUN to Foreign Office, 16 November 1967, telegram no. 3251, ibid. 
93
 Foreign Office to UKUN, 16 November 1967, telegram no. 6331, ibid. 
94
 Tel Aviv to Foreign Office, 19 November 1967, telegram no.1273, ibid. 
95
 UKUN to Foreign Office, 17 November 1967, telegram no.3271, ibid. 
96
 Letter from President Kosygin to President Johnson, undated, document 534, FRUS, 1964-
68, Vol.XIX. 
97
 Letter from President Johnson to Premier Kosygin, 19 November 1967, document 535, 
ibid. 
98
 UKUN to Foreign Office, 20 November 1967, telegram no. 1319, FCO17/515, TNA. 
99
 UKUN to Foreign Office, 20 November 1967, telegram no.3319, ibid. 
100
 UKUN to Foreign Office, 20 November 1967, telegram no.3321, ibid. 
101
 Telegram from the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations, 20 
November 1967, document 536, FRUS, 1964-68, Vol.XIX. 
102
 Letter from Premier Kosygin to President Johnson, undated [21 November 1967], 
document 539, ibid. 
103
 Letter from President Johnson to Premier Kosygin, 21 November 1967, document 540, 
ibid. 
104
 The British were only told about the exchanges a week after the resolution had passed, and 
then only 'because Newsweek got hold of the story' (Memorandum, Day to Palliser, 30 
November 1967, FCO17/515, TNA). 
105
 UKUN to Foreign Office, 21 November 1967, telegram no.3352, ibid. 
106
 Louis, 'The Ghost of Suez and Resolution 242', 240; UKUN to Foreign Office, 22 
November 1967, telegram no.3373, ibid. 
107
 UKUN to Foreign Office, 22 November 1967, telegram no.3373, ibid. UKUN to Foreign 
Office, 24 November 1967, telegram no.3410, ibid. 
40 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
108
 'The Security Council Decision on the Middle East, November 1967', Caradon to Brown, 
1 January 1968, ibid. 
109
 Letter, Bendall to Smith, 29 November 1967, ibid. 
110
 'The Security Council Decision on the Middle East, November 1967', Caradon to Brown, 
1 January 1968, ibid. 
111
 Brown to Caradon, 24 November 1967, telegram no.6724, ibid. 
112
 Brenchley, Britain, the Six-Day War and its Aftermath, 65-71. 
113
 Letter, Dean to Maitland, 30 November 1967, FCO17/515, TNA. 
114
 For Anglo-American relations over the 1973 war see: Geraint Hughes, ‘Britain, the 
Transatlantic Alliance and the Arab-Israeli War of 1973’, Journal of Cold War Studies, x 
(2008), 3-40; Thomas Robb, ‘The Power of Oil: Edward Heath, the ‘Year of Europe’ and the 
Anglo-American ‘Special Relationship’’, Contemporary British History, xxvi (2012), 73-96; 
Alex Spelling, ‘Recrimination and Reconciliation: Anglo-American Relations and the Yom 
Kippur War’, Cold War History, xiii (2013), 485-506; Andrew Scott, Allies Apart: Heath, 
Nixon and the Anglo-American Relationship (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 166-
95. 
115
 Nigel J. Ashton, ‘Love’s Labours Lost: Margaret Thatcher, King Hussein and Anglo-
Jordanian Relations, 1979-1990, Diplomacy & Statecraft, xxii (2011), 651-77; Neil Lochery, 
‘Debunking the Myths: Margaret Thatcher, the Foreign Office and Israel, 1979-1990’, 
Diplomacy & Statecraft, xxi (2010), 690-706. 
116
 Elizabeth Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 1914-1971 (London: Chatto and 
Windus, 1981). 
